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This research contributes to the debates on the efficacy of economic sanctions as a tool of 
international diplomacy. It focuses on corruption, one of the potential unintended 
consequences of sanctions. Using multiple regression on a custom cross-sectional time 
series dataset of more than a thousand observations, this research finds the correlation 
between threats of sanctions and level of corruption statistically significant. The model 
suggests each new round of threats translates into a 1.25% increase in corruption for 
relatively clean states and a 5% increase for already corrupt states. The resulting policy 
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The resolution of World War II defined the global political agenda for many years 
to come. With only a short break after World War I, World War II involved 30 countries 
and took the lives of up to 85 million people, nearly erasing Eastern Europe from the face 
of the Earth. Undoubtedly, humanity could not afford another turn of this vicious circle. 
The desire to avoid a repeat crystallized in the establishment of the United 
Nations, an international institution promoting peace and security. Being a member 
means tolerating armed conflicts only in self-defense or by a consensus decision. This 
proved to be successful: seven decades under the banner of the United Nations made 
inter-state wars close to unthinkable. However, this does not mean all conflicts are solved 
and all disputes are settled. Modern politicians embrace the same old principles and 
pursue the same old goals – it is their policy toolbox that has changed.  
Within this toolbox, a salient place is occupied by sanctions. Whenever countries 
feel the need to threaten other countries, chances are the threats will be of economic and 
diplomatic measures. Unlike wars, sanctions allow extending political demands and 
“punishing” for non-compliance without the use of military. Instead of brute force, they 
rely on economic power; instead of causing deaths, they overwhelm annual budgets; 
instead of bayoneting to obey, they create political pressures. It is a centuries-old 
principle of inducing fear to coerce an outcome, but in its modern, “civilized” iteration. It 
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is no surprise that in the United Nations era, sanctions have significantly increased in 
popularity. 
The natural question of efficacy, however, remains a subject of academic debates. 
Some scholars argue that sanctions may be an answer to certain challenges of the modern 
world. They point out the well-known successful cases and emphasize the fact that 
sanctions helped resolve otherwise desperate diplomatic conundrums (Baldwin, 1985; 
Nossal, 1989; Rogers, 1996; Kaempfer & Lowenberg, 1992; von Soest & Wahman, 
2014; etc.). Others concentrate on the history of fiascos, which, depending on the 
definitions and methods of measurement, can significantly outnumber the successes 
(Pape, 1997; Bapat, Morgan, & Kobayashi, 2014). Scholars warn against hasty decision-
making as sanctions convey economic, diplomatic and social risks. 
Disagreements between “sanctions optimists” and “sanctions pessimists” helped 
create a rather rich picture of the subject. Today, the academic world has sufficient 
knowledge to help policy makers improve the odds of success. In their comprehensive 
dataset, Bapat, Morgan, and Kobayashi (2014) list over 50 variables that throughout the 
years have been argued to affect the outcomes of sanctions: relations between the sender 
and the target, “smart” design, democratic development, participation of international 
institutions, involvement of third-parties, and many more. 
At the same time, whether sanctions work (or how to make them work better), is 
not the only debate we should be having. Sanctions deal with delicate economic and 
social matters. To reach their goals, they must trigger an elaborate chain of 
interdependent events: between imposing and lifting sanctions (successfully or 
unsuccessfully), there is a myriad of reactions, interpretations, and decisions to be made 
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by individuals, interest groups and elites. We cannot assume that the best outcome of this 
complicated process is a compliance with the demands while the worst is a simple 
removal of sanctions without political gains, and the goal is to predict where in between 
the two a particular case will end. 
Things can go wrong at many levels, actors can react in unpredicted ways, which 
can lead to tangible unintended consequences. Most would be negligible, but some may 
turn out significant. Studying and consequently including this into the decision-making 
should become an important part of the mentioned debates. 
The world of possible unintended consequences is vast – where does one begin? 
Several researchers (Heine-Ellison, 2001; Andreas, 2005; Radu, Sabau, Sendroiu, & Pete, 
2015; Kamali, Mashayekh, & Jandaghi, 2016) suggest that the economic nature of 
sanctions coincides with the economic side of corruption, putting the latter at the 
vanguard of investigation. 
What is corruption? A “disease, a cancer” (Amundsen, 1999), a “first-line threat” 
(Radu, Sabau, Sendroiu, & Pete, 2015), “one of the greatest challenges of the 
contemporary world” (Transparency International) – even in tactful scholarly circles, 
corruption has earned some colorful metaphors. Naturally, not everything about it is 
black and white: not all shady deals destroy economies and not every bribe is of bad 
intentions – after all, corruption is just another type of social interaction and therefore a 
part of life. However, the prevailing view on it is negative: there is no place for 
corruption in the 21st century. 
In its most basic terms, corruption includes five universally recognizable socio-
economic practices: bribery, embezzlement, fraud, extortion, and favoritism. Each can 
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assume an infinite number of forms and variations depending on local cultures and legal 
systems. 
Briberies involve sharing resources in exchange for favors. They are commonly 
known as kickbacks, pay-offs or grease money: an actor pays for a favorable decision 
that otherwise would have been disadvantageous. The essence of the action is to “win” an 
otherwise lost cause.   
Embezzlement is misappropriation of resources gathered for public needs: an 
official responsible for a hunger program takes food home instead of sending off to soup 
kitchens. Consensual dispossession is what differs it from a simple theft: there is a gap, in 
which a resource is already not private, but has not yet been converted into a public 
service. An embezzler takes advantage of the gap. 
Fraud involves deceptive persuasion to share resources: “governments importing 
toxic and atomic waste from Western countries, presidents who have printed large 
amounts of national bank notes to pay civil servants and military men, and state or 
parastatal institutions that have persuaded private firms to give them loans, assistance and 
services that will never be paid back” (Amundsen, 1999, p. 12). Once again, consensual 
dispossession is what distinguishes it from a simple criminal activity, but in this case due 
to purposeful misinformation. 
Extortion is extraction of resources by coercion: an actor uses coercive powers to 
pressure or threaten a party to share resources. This is most common in the form of 
“protection,” “security money,” or blackmail. Again, sharing of resources is by consent, 
which, in this case, is induced by the sense of insecurity. The worst forms of extortion 
use state coercive powers. 
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Favoritism is an extreme form of bias in redistribution of powers and resources. It 
involves granting offices or benefits to friends and relatives regardless of skills and 
expertise.  
All the listed have one important thing in common: the beholder’s sense of 
unfairness. It originates from the understanding that should the said practices not be 
involved, the competitive situations would have been resolved differently, in a more 
meritocratic manner. In other words, corruption is recognized in cases where the basic 
principles of competition were artificially distorted, essentially converting losers into 
winners and vice versa. 
It is important to understand, however, that corruption is a product of free market 
just as much as it is a threat to it. It is not uncommon for corruption itself to form a 
market of its own. Some countries are notorious for competitive bribery and government 
positions bidding. The situation sometimes evolves into an environment where a simple 
payment for a political favor is not enough – a businessman must be diverse, inventive, 
and elaborate in his attempts to court a state official. This led some researchers to argue 
that just like the state restricts capitalism to take care of the poor, corruption can serve as 
an equalizer in certain types of economies (Dzhumashev, 2014). 
The rest of its effects and costs on politics, economies, and societies, however, are 
strictly negative. It has been found to cap growth (Mauro, 1995; Mo, 2001; Tanzi & 
Davoodi, 2002), dampen investment, domestic (Brunetti, Kisunko, & Weder, 1998; 
Campos, Lien, & Pradhan, 1999; Mauro, 1996) as well as foreign (Abed & Davoodi, 
2002; Wei, 2000), reduce productivity (Lambsdorff, 2003), misbalance inflation (Al-
Marhubi, 2000), catalyze “grey” sectors of the economy (Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, 
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& Zoido-Lobaton, 2000; Johnson, Kaufmann, & Shleifer, 1997; Schneider, Buehn, & 
Montenegro, 2010), and decrease spending on social projects (Mauro, 1998) mostly 
hurting the poor (Justesen & Bjornskov, 2014). On the entrepreneur level, corruption can 
adversely affect innovation (Lau, Yang, Zhang, and Leung, 2015) and small to medium 
firms’ performance (Van Vu, Tran, Van Nguyen, and Lim, 2016). Zelekha and Sharabi 
(2012) systemize the known consequences as follows:  
• Distortions in the allocation of resources in the economy 
• Increased uncertainty in decision making 
• Degradation of the legal mechanisms  
• Loss of leadership 
• Reduced marginal productivity  
• Increased inequality in the distribution of income 
• Effect on the small business sector 
The list does not end with domestic affairs. Anderson and Stansfield (Anderson & 
Stansfield, 2005) show how the UN-sanctioned international embargo against Ba’athist 
Iraq helped create corruption schemes of dramatic proportions: “the black market was, by 
some distance, the most dynamic sector of the Iraqi economy” (p. 98). Eventually, the 
situation progressed to a state in which the very survival of the regime depended on 
illegal trade with neighbors. With the introduction of the Oil-for-Food Program, not 
necessarily by design, but due to economic and social compensative mechanisms, one 
highly corrupt country dragged into its shady business a whole body of other 
beneficiaries from Libya, India, Indonesia, Myanmar, Russia, Egypt, France, Canada, 
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Brazil, and more. Evidently, from a certain point of severity, domestic corruption can 
affect international affairs, making already complicated cases worse.  
This makes corruption an important topic of interest and a crucial object of study. 
The 30 years of scholarly debates have uncovered a lot in regards to why and how it is 
bad. However, scholars have only begun to understand its sources and whether it can be 
linked to external factors. Logically, economic sanctions with their economy-damaging 
nature could have an effect (Kamali, Mashayekh, & Jandaghi, 2016). At the same time, 
sanctions do not have to be applied to reach their political goals (Morgan, Bapat, & 
Kobayashi, 2014); threatening sanctions, just like threatening a war, sometimes is enough 







II. ANALYTICAL CHALLENGES OF STUDYING CORRUPTION IN THE 
CONTEXT OF EXTERNAL ECONOMIC PRESSURES 
 
Corruption is a broad and complex topic. Even within a single country, the way 
society understands and tolerates corruption can radically differ. As Peters and Welch 
(1978) point out, “what may be ‘corrupt’ to one citizen, scholar, or public official is ‘just 
politics’ to another, or ‘indiscretion’ to a third” (p. 974). So, when it comes to cross-
country comparisons, defining the problem can be more challenging than solving it. 
An example of this is Russian “administrative resource,” which describes the 
state-driven capabilities of regional bureaucrats to pressure political opponents. It took no 
less than a book (Wilson, 2005) to introduce it to the West. The challenge was within the 
strikingly similar practice in Western democracies called lobbying, which is generally 
perceived as legal and healthy. It took an effort to describe how a legitimate career path 
in one part of the world is criminal in the other. 
There are other examples: “guanxi” and grey areas between public and private in 
China (Johnston, 1997), “neopopulist” leaders with support bases built by mass media in 
Latin America (Weyland, 1998), “wasta” in the Middle Eastern societies (Barnett, 
Yandle, & Naufal, 2011), grey economies in transitional post-Soviet states (Johnson, 
Kaufman, & Shleifer, 1997), “legal” corruption in G7 members (Kaufmann & Vicente, 
Legal Corruption, 2005), etc. How could one study something this diverse? 
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Over the years, scholars have come up with two ways to approach corruption in 
its variety. One is through frameworks. It first appeared as a way to coordinate research: 
many well-known early publications (cf. Rundquist et al., 1977; Scoble, 1973; Gardiner 
1970, Berg et al., 1976) focused on interrelated topics, but in terms of methodology and 
policy implications were very disjointed from each other. To address this, Peters & 
Welch (1978) suggested systemizing the available knowledge by aspects of legality, 
public interest, and public opinion. 
They wanted to illustrate how a more systematic outlook can help advance 
research and provided their own framework as an example. The idea was to define 
corruption “by its four components: the donor, the favor, the public official and the 
payoff” (p. 974). All four could be separately conceptualized and identified allowing for 
better selection and comparisons. Slight variations of this framework are used to this day. 
Another approach is modular. It stems from a widespread definition, which 
throughout the years has had a life of its own. It first appeared as “behavior which 
deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding pecuniary or 
status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding 
influence” (Nye, 1967). After a few iterations, it got distilled down to “abuse of public 
power and influence for private ends” (Waterbury, 1973) and “illegitimate use of public 
power to benefit a private interest” (Morris, 1991). From that point, researchers started 
using it as a basis for filling in options to fit their agendas. For example, Neild (2002) 
added more precision: “the breaking by public persons, for the sake of private financial or 
political gain, of the rules of conduct in public affairs prevailing in a society in the period 
under consideration”. Transparency International included a perceptional edge: “abuse of 
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entrusted power for private gain.” Senior (2006) tried to reach beyond the private sector: 
“covertly gives a favour to a corruptee or to a nominee to influence action(s) that benefit 
the corruptor or a nominee, and for which the corruptee has authority.” 
Within this approach, studies that strive for higher case coverage stay with the 
basic version and are typically criticized for a rather generic and westernized approach. 
Indeed, Russian administrative resource is not exactly about private gains and Chinese 
grey economy is not driven by state powers. However, this is an inevitable trade-off for 
those who choose to use statistics, which has become a popular trend in the recent years. 
The 30 years of scholarly debates did not clear up the field’s basic concepts. 
Earlier works tend to be overcomplicated with details (Peters & Welch, 1978); recent 
ones breeze through, if not avoid clear definitions (Senior, 2006). There seems to be a 
common assumption that readers are aware of the early debates and would rather agree 
on a widespread generic. This is a problem as well as a solution (Senior, 2006; Choi, 
2007; Kalantari, 2010). Perhaps, there is no better way to assess the situation than to call 
it a pursuit of the Holy Grail: “endless, exhausting and ultimately futile” – since 
“corruption, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder” (Williams, 1976). 
Pragmatically speaking, it may be for the best. Modern studies on corruption 
benefit from this lack of uncontested definitions. Instead of concentrating on a handful of 
well-defined cases, researchers take big data on corruption and juxtapose it against even 
bigger economic data. It does not lead to as deep of an understanding of underlying 
mechanisms, but the resulting implications are real-world policy recommendations, 
applicable in the West as well as in the East. It is important to understand, however, that 
the knowledge generated this way has limits. What we are looking for are causes of 
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corruption, but what we are finding are “factors that increase the possibility of its 
occurrence” (Kalantari, 2010).  
As basic concepts remain contested, so do many theories, which lose or gain 
significance with slightly different definitions. Serra (2006) mentions how La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1999) highlight legal system and religious 
affiliation as explanations for corruption – while Adser`a, Boix and Payne (2000) find the 
same variables insignificant compared to government accountability, supported by 
Brunetti and Weder’s (2001) idea of free press in a democratic environment. Ades and Di 
Tella (1999) claims openness to foreign trade an important factor, which is confirmed by 
Leide and Weidmann (1999), but Treisman (2000) finds trade to be insignificant if 
controlled for development and uninterrupted democracy. Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi 
(2003) illustrate how electoral rules can curb corruption through accountability – but 
Adser`a, Boix and Payne (2003) counter the notion with their statistically insignificant 
control proportional representation. The idea that decentralization affects rent-seeking 
and thus decreases corruption also has been confirmed by Fisman & Gatti (2000) and 
later contested by Treisman (2000) in his all-inclusive study. 
A big share of the literature revolves around a notorious correlation between 
corruption and economic underdevelopment, which implies rich countries are usually 
clean while poor countries are corrupt. This correlation is sometimes referred to as “some 
correlation” (Serra, 2006), sometimes as “strong and unambiguous” (Amundsen, 1999, p. 
15). It has been touched on by numerous academic and mass media publications, yet 
there is still no consensus on what causes what and how. 
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This insight, however, serves as a good starting point. The assumption is that 
corruption and economic underdevelopment are related through the realm of politics. If 
so, one needs to consider all three, decompose into variables and trace the ones linked to 
each other. Such an outlook calls for rational choice and structure paradigms with mid- to 
high-N case selection.  
Within this outlook, research revolves around competition, information, and 
control. A recurring argument, for example, is that corruption is an inherent trait of a 
rentier state. That is, corruption is generated by the lack of competition, which can be a 
result of poor control (Laffont & N'Guessan, 2001) and reverse incentives (Svensson, 
1999). All of these are common in the states relying heavily on narrow sources of 
revenue that can be redistributed by elites for political gains (Ades & Di Tella, 1999), 
hence rentier states. 
Another idea is that macroeconomic factors can affect corruption. This is 
intriguing since the macro-economy can be controlled to an extent by governments, 
which implies simple and effective remedy recommendations. However, direct causal 
links have not been found so far. A very promising work suggested not inflation itself, 
but a high inflation variability creates a thriving environment for corruption (Braun & Di 
Tella, 2004). However, by high inflation variability this research meant the one typical 
for the third world countries, who are simply not able to control it. Consequently, the 
policy recommendation that follows logically from this – that governments manage 
inflation – is irrelevant for most of them.    
Among political factors, a lot revolves around what makes a political system 
balanced, mature and more democratic. As such, Rajeev and Nelson (1998) showed that 
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merely the size of the public sector along with its structure of expenses can be enough to 
explain an accompanying corruption. The same can be said about over-accumulation of 
discretionary powers (Johnson, Kaufmann, & Zoido-Lobaton, 1998). Johnston (1997) 
demonstrates how a misalignment between the political and economic sides of a reform, 
when one outruns the other, can trigger corruption. If not reforms, or political actions in 
general, then the environment in which they have been taken can be responsible for the 
increased corruption. Poorly designed anti-corruption efforts aimed at that, which is not 
significant in a particular case, are inefficient at best and are likely to discredit the mere 
concept of war against corruption, ruining the chances of success (Quah, 1999). If the 
elites are not ready, "stringent and unwelcomed organizational changes may generate 
significant pockets of resistance among the rank and file” (Fleming & Lafferty, 2000, p. 
163). Industrial politics themselves can also cause some extra corruption (Ades & Di 
Tella, 1997). 
Another commonly held assumption is that corruption is negatively correlated 
with the level of democracy (Friedrich, 1993). Democratic institutions increase control 
and competition and therefore reduce corruption. However, this also may be a case of 
misinterpretation. In the modern world, most of the democratic countries turn out to also 
be a part of the rich West (another notorious insight), which, as discussed above, 
negatively correlates with corruption. Johnston & Hao (1995) discuss how this may be a 
self-fulfilling prophecy, nonetheless admiring the corruption-deterring mechanisms built 
into democracies. A different angle is offered by Weyland (1998), who agrees that 
democracies themselves may be inherently clean, but democratization could be inherently 
corrupt, which can be illustrated with Latin American “neopolulist” leaders. The latest 
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take on this belongs to Serra (2006), who confirmed Treisman’s (2000) theory that not 
democratic development itself, but a prolonged exposure to democracy (50 years) creates 
a cleaner environment.  
In fact, the second insight has inspired an entire branch of research of its own. 
The driving assumption implies that among the many historical, religious, ethnic, gender, 
and other features, there are ones that can predetermine whether a country is destined to 
be corrupt. Unlike structural and rational choice paradigms, this cultural approach 
focuses on practice rather than concepts.  
An interesting revelation within this approach is how westernized it really is. It 
was not always clear that what in the West has been defined as the remains of a medieval, 
economy-restricting practice, in the East can still be “socially embedded in 'logics' of 
negotiation, gift-giving, solidarity, predatory authority and redistributive accumulation” 
(de Sardan, 1999) and essentially be a part of the cultural code. Understanding this “may 
explain the contrast between Africa and Europe, and the differences between the catholic 
Western European countries with a ‘Latin’ culture and the Nordic, protestant countries” 
(Amundsen, 1999). 
In fact, the differences in how corruption is perceived in various parts of the 
world and if it is at all recognized as corruption, could be among the main suspects. In his 
comprehensive survey, Heidenheimer gathered evidence from available works of 
economic, cultural, and even linguistic perspectives to come to an intriguing conclusion 
that corruption, at least in certain Asian and African countries, could be merely a “result 
of globalization, the spread of democracy, and major scandals and reform initiatives” 
(Heidenheimer, 1978). Surely, there is a certain element of time context and bias to the 
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argument – but more recent works (Johnson, Kaufman, & Shleifer, 1997) show that at 
least partially the argument holds even when using modern, more sophisticated, research 
methods.  
Recent works have been more inclusive and less grounded in paradigms. 
Treisman (2000) successfully tested a combination of rather unsystematic factors – the 
Protestant tradition, a history of British rule, a developed economy, high imports, a 
federal state, and long exposure to democracy – to affect corruption. Serra (2006) has re-
evaluated his findings based on the Leamer Extreme-Bounds Analysis (1978, 1983, 
1985) as modified by Levine and Renelt (1992), revealing five variables to be statistically 
significant: “richness” of a country, prolonged exposure to democracy, Protestant history, 
political stability, and, most intriguingly, the lack of colonial heritage. 
The overwhelming majority of the research to date focuses on within-country 
factors. If a country can be called a harmonized system, the focus is on its internal design, 
and the variance in corruption is explained with variance in configurations of system-
forming factors: better public control, higher competition, less incentives for rent-
seeking, lack of cultural predispositions, etc. Very few attempts were made to look at 
external stimuli, even though economy, one of the intuitively involved factors, clearly 
can be affected if not manipulated from the outside. 
One such external stimulus is international trade openness or international 
exposure. Although contested (Serra, 2006), the idea that it affects corruption is still of an 
interest. Its biggest critique, the fact that the variable representing trade in the original 
research was found insignificant when controlling for development and uninterrupted 
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democracy, is indeed prominent and has been replicated (Beesley, 2014), but does not 
dismiss the idea completely. 
There may be something more of an economic nature that can trigger corruption-
inducing mechanisms. Evidence suggests that international economic variables can affect 
corruption by triggering institutional changes (Wei, 2000), reducing or increasing 
opportunities for rent-seeking behavior for decision-makers (Krueger, 1974; Gatti, 2001), 
influencing the logic of bargaining for businesses as well as state officials (Reinnika & 
Svensson, 2003; Shleifer & Vishny, 2004), altering the level of competition, and 
solidifying norms on corruption in general (Sandholz & Gray, 2003).  
This research attempts yet another approach. It seeks to link rising level of 
corruption to threats of sanctions. It argues that just signaling the upcoming economic 
difficulties may be enough to trigger certain social defense mechanisms within the target 
state. Among these mechanisms are the ones that intensify the struggle for resources 
between domestic interest groups in a context of potential economic scarcity, which 
eventually leads to corruption. 
The function of the threats is to signal upcoming economic hardships in a pursuit 
of political concessions: the signals must reach domestic elites and incentivize them to 
put pressure on policy makers. However, there is no guarantee the elites will interpret and 
react to signaling in a predicted way. 
Threatened by a looming economic scarcity, some may indeed seek relief in an 
attempt to change state policies. This may prevent harm to the economy, keep the growth 
rate stable, and retain the status quo between the groups of interest and their according 
shares of the “economic pie.” Others, however, may find it easier to secure their shares of 
17 
the potentially shrinking “economic pie” through increased competition for the still 
available resources. This reaction may seem more justifiable to the actors since it can 
provide faster and better results, but since it involves reallocation of resources, it may 
lead to fiercer tensions. 
By nature, economic sanctions seek to induce behavioral changes through 
harming economies. Their effects – impact on investment and growth (Mauro, 1995; 
Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; Campos et al., 1999), inflation (Al-Marhubi, 2000), trade 
(Lambsdorff, 1998; Anderson and Marcouiller, 1999), bureaucratic efficiency (Rose-
Ackerman, 1997), entrepreneurial activity (Murphy, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1990), 
redistribution of wealth (Kurer, 1993) – are intuitive, well-known, widely advertised and 
theoretically confirmed. It is also known that sanctions by themselves are only a part of 
the bigger picture – threats of sanctions may achieve political goals without any real 
embargo impositions (Clifton, Bapat, & Krustev, 2009).  
A signal of an upcoming round of sanctions can be read as a looming reduction of 
the amount of wealth potentially accessible to domestic elites or an entire nation. In such 
a situation, any rational actor will reach three obvious calculations. First – that he does 
not wish to experience a reduction in available economic resources, and should do 
anything to minimize or avert it. Second – that any potential profits should be converted 
into actual ones as soon as possible as they may become unavailable due to sanctions. 
Third – that everybody else is reaching similar conclusions and getting ready to fight for 
their share of “economic pie.” Therefore, the degree of the competition, bureaucratic as 
well as entrepreneurial, is bound to increase. 
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Eventually, the situation may spiral into “any means necessary,” drawing in 
political figures, state enterprises and bureaucratic institutions accompanied by their 
access to state powers. Thus, the country is left with an increased level of corruption even 
if sanctions themselves were not imposed or did not do much harm. In a worst case 
scenario, threats or sanctions not only fail to induce desired political changes, but result 
in a country with higher levels of corruption, complicating the case both domestically and 
in the international arena.    
Several authors have previously tried to link sanctions and corruption, but none 
have considered threats. Comparing targeted and comprehensive sanctions, Heine-Ellison 
(2001) discusses the possibility of unintended consequences that can include corruption 
in the targeted country. Similarly, categorizing potential aftereffects, Andreas (2005) 
warns that sanctions may result in a “symbiosis” between criminals and politicians, 
effectively leading to corruption that stays even after sanctions are gone. A collective of 
authors (Radu, Sabau, Sendroiu, & Pete, 2015) recently analyzed the effect of “coercive 
diplomacy” on corruption using the MIMIC model to measure the volume of “unofficial 
economy” in a country. A different collective (Kamali, Mashayekh, & Jandaghi, 2016) 
recently tested if sanctions adversely affect corruption in a cross-country comparison 
manner. 
Considering a bigger picture, sanctions continue to inspire some dynamic 
scholarly debates. Throughout the years, the prevailing views on the subject have been 
swinging between skepticism and optimism. The commonly reported success rates, which 
vary from 4% (Pape, 1997) to 37% (Bapat, Morgan, & Kobayashi, 2014) depending on 
the definitions and methods of measurement, are not universally accepted. 
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 The entire body of scholarship can be divided into three time periods or “waves” 
(Pape, 1997). The first wave addresses the question of efficacy, typically with in-depth 
analyses of low- to mid-N studies identifying and evaluating underlying mechanisms. As 
such, Johan Galtung studied the case of Rhodesia comparing a state to “an organism with 
certain self-maintaining potential” that reacts to outside stimuli, sanctions being one of 
them (Galtung, 1967, p. 409); Hoffman (1967) followed with a dichotomous comparison 
of Rhodesia and Italy; Baer analyzed the Italian-Ethiopian War concluding that as an 
external signal, sanctions “were used by the Italian government … to consolidate 
Mussolini’s personal rule” (Baer, 1973, p. 178). Others evaluated sanctions as an 
alternative to wars: Wallensteen (1968) highlighted the significance of self-preserving 
mechanisms concluding that sanctions “have many of the same disadvantages as military 
action, due to their tendency to increase internal cohesion” (p. 265). Citing the case of 
Israel, Losman (1979) introduced the concept of split outcomes – a case of sanctions can 
be successful economically, but unsuccessful politically. Doxey assessed the case of UN 
sanctions against South Africa using her own framework and concluded that “the 
deterrent and coercive force of sanctions was weak on almost every count” (Doxey, 1972, 
p. 547). 
The second wave starts around mid-1980s and goes on until mid-1990s. It is 
characterized by a shift towards the large-N with higher generalizability and a newfound 
optimism about the sanctions’ efficacy. In many aspects, it was a reaction to 
advancements in methodology and available data. As such, one of the most cited works 
of the research field belongs to this wave: the first comprehensive dataset that included 
all known cases from 1914 to 1990 (Hufbauer, Jeffrey, & Elliott, 1990). Through 
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broadening the universe of cases, authors reinvented the debate confirming the success 
rates as high as 34%. Rogers explained this sudden reinvention: “successes are widely 
unreported, while their failures are exaggerated by those with an interest in either 
avoiding their use, or in using their instruments” (Rogers, 1996). In addition, the topic of 
signaling was further developed into the notion that sanctions “send signals to target 
states and allies achieving goals more important than direct behavioral changes” 
(Baldwin, 1985), which later was compared to punishing children for bad behavior, 
calling it a “distinct irrational expressive element” (Nossal, 1989) of the international 
process. Another important development was the notion that even without severe 
damage, sanctions may produce significant policy outcomes through social mechanisms, 
such as domestic pressure (Kaempfer & Lowenberg , 1992). Years later, this inspired 
comprehensive theories linking types of regime (Allen, 2008) or political institutions 
(Lektzian & Souva, 2007) with the outcomes of sanctions. 
The third wave, beginning in the late 90s, is characterized by the return to 
skepticism and the search for more detailed determinants of outcomes. The tone was set 
by Pape’s (1997) work, where he criticized the main dataset of the time (Hufbauer, 
Jeffrey, & Elliott, 1990) and corroborated only 5 successful outcomes out of 115. This 
once again reanimated the efficacy debates starting with Elliott defending the “limited 
utility” of sanctions (Elliott, 1998), a critique by Drury who called field-accepted 
correlations statistically insignificant (Drury, 1998), more critique by Pape stressing the 
possibility of unintended human costs and damage to senders of sanctions (1998) and a 
contribution by Drezner (1999), who, by re-evaluating available data, came up with an 
inherent flaw in the logic of sanctions: they are likely to be placed on adversaries, but 
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because they are adversaries, target states will not concede, thus making it a vicious 
circle. After this, scholars refocused the debate from whether or not sanctions work to 
what makes sanctions work: historical relations between the target and the sender of the 
sanctions (Allen, 2005), economic wealth and political stability (Jing, Kaempfer, & 
Lowenberg, 2003), multilateral cooperation and the influence of international 
organizations (Bapat & Morgan, 2009), balance of power between the sender, the target 
and the allies (McLean & Whang, 2010), etc. This increased the demand for quality data 
was fulfilled by two reissues of Hufbauer’s dataset (2007, 2009) and TIES (Clifton, 
Bapat, & Krustev, 2009). 
As mentioned before, modern studies typically do not focus on whether sanctions 
are successful or unsuccessful, instead exploring what is around the subject. This research 
fits into the trend of not only discussing what non-economic effects could be caused by 
sanctions, but also bringing corruption into the picture, thus adding one more variable to 







 III. METHODOLOGY 
 
Formally stated, the hypothesis to be tested is:  
threats of economic sanctions increase corruption levels in target states.  
 
Due to a short-sighted misinterpretation of the threats, certain domestic elites may find it 
more rational to maximize their shares of the potentially dwindling economy rather than 
pressure political leaders to seek for a diplomatic solution. In the context of looming 
economic scarcity, the resulting political competition is bound to be fierce, and will force 
the involved actors to use any means necessary, including corrupt schemes and methods. 
 
Method  
There are three potential approaches to testing if threats of sanctions, in fact, lead 
to increased corruption. One is to select a number of cases and perform a process-tracing 
analysis, deep enough to identify the causal chain. The cases for such analysis need to be 
illustrative as well as transparent, with wide availability of sources and numerical data. 
This is rarely true for sanctions, which are typically followed by some sort of an 
informational blockade or targeted at regimes with a bad governing and press freedom 
records. Even basic indices, such as GDP, are not available for sanctioned Iraq, Iran, or 
Cuba. At the same time, such sanctions are of the most interest. 
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Another approach is to compare corruption before, during and after sanctions: the 
difference would indicate a causal link. Such comparisons can be performed on a low to 
medium number of observations and can be based on qualitative or quantitative evidence. 
The data does not have to be as detailed, and a higher coverage compensates for selection 
bias. The downside is the possibility of equifinality when accounting for a potential lag, 
especially with unstandardized qualitative evidence: after sanctions are lifted, corruption 
will not stop immediately while chosen indicators, such as news reports, will not 
necessarily be instantly available. 
The third approach is to compare corruption in sanctioned countries to corruption 
in countries that are not sanctioned or sanctioned differently. Per modern research 
standards, this approach requires a vigorous case selection based on a set of control 
variables, with typically a low to medium number of observations. MDS or MSS designs 
(George & Bennett, 2005) are used to identify the causal relationship. This approach is 
far from perfect when applied to studying sanctions or corruption. It can suffer from a 
variety of biases and may be unavailable for certain countries due to scarce data.  
A reasonable compromise between the available options is statistical analysis. 
Modern statistical methods can analyze data over time and across sections 
simultaneously, combining two of the mentioned approaches into one. The data behind 
such an analysis does not have to be excessively detailed – instead, it must be uniform 
across time and across sections. Relaxed requirements allow for maximized case 
inclusion, potentially close to a complete coverage. The wide case selection deters 
selection bias, and uniformity can somewhat compensate for data imperfections.  
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The method to be used is multiple regression, a variation of regression analysis 
for estimating relationships among several variables. Though the hypothesis implies just 
one independent variable and one dependent variable, it will be tested against a set of 
control variables for robustness. Due to how multiple regression is calculated, control 
variables must be considered a mathematical part of the model as well as a theoretical 
part. This means that even though isolated arguments can be made based on individual 
tests, any sort of policy implications or forecasts based on a statistically confirmed model 
should account for statistically confirmed control variables as well. 
An important assumption to be made is that data will never be flawless. No matter 
the effort, something subjective, misinterpreted or mistaken could bias the numbers. This 
is especially the case for large, comprehensive datasets, assembled over the course of 
many years by a rotating collective of authors. The same applies to data gathering and 
reconfiguring. This is a problem, but it is not fatal.  Modern software is able to account 
for less than perfect data. Instead of a complete failure, imperfections result in lower 
correlation coefficients. The roots of the imperfections need to be identified, potentially 
with further research – but if the relationship is statistically significant, the hypothesis 
behind must be reckoned with. At the same time, one should not expect very high T-
values and R-squared when studying politics and human behavior. In comparison to 
economic publications, where R-squared above 0.7 along with triple the threshold for 
statistical significance are common, just the statistical significance is enough for social 
sciences.  
One could argue, for example, purely economic sanctions, such as the ones by 
WTO, are not likely to have a tangible effect on corruption and should be excluded from 
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the research. The same applies to outliers, such as the US being the most sanctioned state 
by numbers, yet incomparable to North Korea or Cuba qualitatively. The model will react 
to distortions and report lower coefficients. However, should the correlation stand 
significant with contentious cases, outliers, and imperfect data, at the very least one could 
argue there is some validity to the hypothesis. 
 
Data for The Independent Variable 
The independent variable is formulated as “threats of economic sanctions,” 
defined as threats of actions to limit or end economic relations with a country in an effort 
to persuade that country to change its policies, based on the works by Bapat, Morgan & 
Kobayashi (2009, 2014). 
Conceptually, a threat is a derivative of sanctions. The two exist together and can 
be measured in a similar fashion: through official documents, politicians’ statements, and 
news articles. The resulting evidence is objective and directly linked to the concept. Data 
gathering techniques are debatable: documents can be overlooked, politicians 
misinterpreted, and news articles faked. However, over the years, most of these are 
corrected through peer review within the scholarly circles. 
The two widespread sources of data gathered in this manner are the Peterson 
Institute for International Economics (Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, & Oegg, 2008) and 
Threats and Imposition of Sanctions project (Morgan, Bapat, & Kobayashi, 2014). Both 
have a reputation of industry standards and have been updated several times since the 
original issues. The former lists 170 cases, 1914 to 2002, with some extra coverage till 
2006. It mostly focuses on success measures, with only secondary attention to associated 
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factors. The latter lists 1412 cases of economic sanctions, 1945 to 2005 with limited 
coverage till 2009, and specifically focuses on identifying threats, which are coded as 
separate entities. The higher number of cases includes politically inspired sanctions as 
well as strictly economic ones since both fit the definition and may be preceded or 
followed with threats. TIES will be used as the source of data for this research.  
The dataset separately lists sanctions and threats of sanctions. Combining them, 
the authors code the possibility of the two being synchronized or desynchronized in real-
life scenarios. Typically, sanctions are imposed shortly after an extended threat and lifted 
along with it. However, some threats achieve political goals without sanctions; others 
remain officially extended for years, never followed by sanctions; and certain types of 
sanctions (WTO) are imposed and lifted without extending threats. 
The data is presented as a list of cases. Each case is accompanied by an extensive 
number of variables, including start and end dates, sender, target, involved institutions, 
issues, anticipated and actual costs, type, final outcome, and many more. In the following 
extract, the sender Japan has sanctioned the target state US without issuing any threats for 
a year over trade practices (13).  
Table 1. An example of TIES data. 
startyear endyear sender1 targetstate1 threat imposition Issue 
2003 2004 Japan USA 0 1 13 
 
Data for The Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is formulated as “corruption” and defined as abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain, based on a widespread understanding of the 
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phenomenon. Due to its nature, corruption is hard to measure and therefore linking 
“corruption the concept” with “corruption the variable” is an inevitable compromise. 
One option is to use an estimate based on a mathematical calculation, such as the 
volume of unofficial economy based on the MIMIC model (Radu, Sabau, Sendroiu, & 
Pete, 2015). It is possible to approximate the volume of the official economy judging by 
the tax revenues and then compare it to the total volume of the economy based on 
traceable bank transactions and printed banknotes: the difference will represent the 
“grey” economy. However, “grey” does not automatically mean corrupt, and supporting 
one’s research with an estimation, based on other estimations that were also estimated, 
does not add credibility. From a certain point, there is no good way to interpret the 
numbers. 
The other option is to use proxies. Proxies measure phenomena relevant to the 
concept, but not the concept itself. For corruption, it can imply uncovered scandals with 
government officials, investigated briberies, respondents’ experiences, etc. This is a great 
way to capture and represent perceptions and local specifics as well. Whether the 
resulting scores are fair and valid across countries is debatable, but studies have 
confirmed at a minimum the usability of such approaches for scientific research 
(Wilhelm, 2002). 
The choice of cross-country, over-time proxies for corruption is limited. The 
renowned “Corruption Perception Index” by Transparency International and a lesser 
known “Control of Corruption” from Worldwide Governance Indicators by the World 
Bank both combine survey data from various sources into comparable scores on an 
annual basis. 
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The Corruption Perception Index has been used as a source of data on corruption 
for years. Journalists praise it for being digestible and concise, scholars like it for the 
wide coverage and consistency. The CPI gives each observed country an annual score on 
a scale of 0 to 10 for the years 1995 through 2012 and 0 to 100 afterwards. The score is 
an estimate of 13 surveys and assessments from 12 different institutions: clean countries 
score high while corrupt ones score low. 1 To appear in the rating, a country must be 
assessed by at least three sources. Evidently, this is not always the case, and the data does 
not 100% conform across time: a country can be unrepresented in the rating for a year or 
two. 
Even though CPI has been reviewed in scholarly circles (Wilhelm, 2002) with 
positive results, it remains a target for strong criticism (Cobham, 2013), mainly for the 
choice of methodology. The original aim of the project was to rank countries relevant to 
each other. Before 2012, individual scores were a byproduct of the corresponding ranks. 
This means that additions and exclusions of countries or underlying sources would affect 
individual scores of the remaining countries. In other words, a country may have received 
a +0.01 not because it became less corrupt, but because some other country was not in the 
rating. This is well explained in pre-2012 publications by Transparency International’s 
in-house scholar: 
“Year-to-year comparisons of a country's score may not only result 
from a changing perception of a country's performance, but also from a 
                                                 
1 The African Development Bank, the Bertelsmann Foundation, the Economist Intelligence Unit, 
Freedom House, Global Insight, International Institute for Management Development, Political and 
Economic Risk Consultacy, Political Risk Services, the World Economic Forum, the World Bank and the 
World Justice Project. 
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changing sample and methodology. If the composition of sources 
reporting on a country changes the country’s score may change. Such a 
change would then not relate to an actual improvement or deterioration 
but rather to small differences between sources in arriving at a final 
score” (Lambsdorff, 2008) 
The authors nonetheless recommend using their data for over time comparisons, if 
caution is exercised. They explain that approximation techniques they use somewhat 
compensate for differences in sources, and fluctuations of the sample size are close to 
negligible. In the year 2008, for example, the number of countries remained unchanged as 
Puerto Rico entered the rating while Grenada dropped out (Lambsdorff, 2008). They also 
measure the potential effect of methodology on the scores and offer a threshold of 0.3: 
“the considerable decline in scores of at least 0.3 does not result from technical factors – 
actual changes in perceptions are responsible for the drop in the score” (Lambsdorff, 
2008, p. 4). 
In 2012, Transparency International attempted to address the problem with a 
substantial change in methodology. It made pre-2012 scores incompatible with post-2012 
scores, which is emphasized by a different post-2012 scale.  
An alternative to CPI is World Governance Indicators by the World Bank. The 
project covers 200 countries, measuring six dimensions of governance: Voice and 
Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. All six 
measures are aggregate indicators of many underlying variables drawn from surveys and 
existing data sources. 
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Control of corruption captures “perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests” (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 
2010, p. 4). The index rates countries annually on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5, where -2.5 is very 
corrupt and 2.5 very clean. Similar to the CPI, it reflects perceptions of survey 
respondents from public, private, and NGO experts worldwide. The authors use an 
Unobserved Component Model, which accounts for the assumption that a social 
phenomenon like corruption cannot be physically measured and can only be 
approximated from the scores of given indicators.  
The Control of Corruption measure also suffers from the unguaranteed 
availability of underlying sources. The situation has been gradually improving throughout 
the years, and recent scores are based on 5 to 10 sources, but the first half of 2000s is 
plagued by uncertainty. The model used by the authors returns not the scores, but arrays 
of the possible values, from which the means are calculated and reported as the final 
values. Therefore, the corresponding standard errors and confidence intervals are also 
provided. The authors warn that about a third of the entire dataset (including Control of 
Law and others) may be unreliable. A closer look at the data confirms this as some of the 
values exceed the scale of -2.5 to 2.5. However, the scores are advertised as comparable 
over time as well as across countries in a bigger picture manner.2 
                                                 
2 WGI FAQ: “For approximately two-thirds of all possible pairwise country comparisons on the 
WGI, margins of error reflecting 90% confidence intervals do not overlap, indicating statistically 
significant differences.  Looking at changes over time over long periods such as a decade, typically around 
8 percent of countries covered will show a significant improvement or decline in the WGI measures.  
However, many small changes over shorter periods, or small differences between countries with similar 
ranks on the WGI, are not significant and should not be overinterpreted.” 
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The data lists countries’ scores on a time scale of years, providing the standard 
error values, the number of used sources, the ranking relative to other countries and 
confidence interval specifications. 
Table 2. An example of WGI data. 
  1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 
country/territory estimate stderr numsrc rank lower upper estimate stderr numsrc rank lower upper 
afghanistan -1.85 0.56 1.00 0.49 0.00 17.48 -1.84 0.51 1.00 0.49 0.00 14.08 
albania -1.09 0.47 2.00 11.71 0.49 43.20 -1.01 0.28 4.00 13.66 2.43 35.44 
 
Control Variables 
As previously mentioned, control variables play an important part in statistical 
analysis. They serve two purposes. First, competing for significance, they represent a 
benchmark to which the potential correlation between main variables is compared. 
Second, they help structure the data if the correlation between main variables is expected 
to be subtle. For example, one might discover that the demand for ice cream correlates 
with phases of the Moon. If regressed in isolation, it may appear so, even though it is not 
scientifically correct. Adding control variables, such as season, will reduce the correlation 
coefficient for Moon phases, showing that time of the year may be a more important 
factor. And outside temperature as another control variable will additionally structure the 
data, potentially rendering Moon phases insignificant. 
The first control variable for this research is not inspired by any particular 
research, but its shadow follows many, if not most, relevant studies. It is formulated as 
“Rule of Law” and defined as the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts based on the works by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010). As 
argued by many, corruption may be a result of a less than perfect political system, the key 
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structural element of which is laws. All other components, such as proper salaries or 
political accountability, can complement the law system, but not replace it. Not only does 
the absence of working laws create incentives for corrupt behavior, but it also makes any 
anti-corruption efforts useless as most of them will come as reforms and can only be as 
efficient as the basic laws of a country. 
The data for “Rule of Law” is sourced from the WGI project by the World Bank. 
The data comes as an approximation of multiple surveys, expert assessments and 
document studies and is uniform across time as well as across countries. The coverage is 
almost identical to that of one of the dependent variables, which means less excluded 
cases during data transformation. 
The second control variable is formulated as “Voice and Accountability” and 
defined as the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media 
based on Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010). It is inspired by the bulk of research 
that argues public control plays the key role in deterring corruption. The theories 
mentioned in Chapter II share a common understanding that holding high-level 
politicians and low-level state officials accountable for actions is very important. It can 
be achieved through a free press and general freedom to speak one’s mind. The data for 
the “voice and accountability” variable is also taken from the WGI, due to the same 
benefits of a wide coverage and homogeneity.  
The third control variable is formulated as “Rentier State” and represents the 
capacity of the government to benefit from redistribution of wealth earned by extraction 
of natural resources. Theoretically (Leite & Weidmann, 1999), the concept of rentier 
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states is not necessarily limited to economies dependent on resource extraction. During 
the Spanish Price Revolution, Spain functioned as a rentier state even though the gold 
was imported from the New World, not extracted domestically. The looming “Bitcoin 
Revolution,” if it ever happens, may create rentier states as well, even though Bitcoin 
mining is not real mining at all. “Petrocracies” are just the most common example today, 
therefore the most straightforward way to measure this variable is to account for 
percentages of GDP generated by natural resource exports. The data for this variable is 
taken from the World Bank, and represents percentage of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal 
rents, mineral rents, and forest rents in a country’s annual GDP. 
The fourth control is “Imports” and it accounts for international trade in which a 
country is involved. Trade is a common component or requisite in theories explaining 
corruption or forecasting its consequences. Its most recent reiteration belongs to Serra 
(2006), who confirmed the causal power. Additionally, international trade is a part of 
economic development, which, as previously mentioned, is often found to negatively 
correlate with corruption. This makes up a hard test for the independent variable in 
question, which must stand the test against a control well-known to highly correlate with 
the dependent variable. The source for this variable is World Bank data on import 
percentage of a country’s GDP.  
The fifth control variable is related to Serra’s (2006) verdict that higher 
parliamentary representation of women reduces corruption. In a broader context, higher 
representation is a sign of a more developed democracy. The latter is often argued to 
deter corruption due to various accountability mechanisms and emphasis on checks and 
balances, but the actual measures of democratic development are very arbitrary. Various 
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options exist, but by far the “Percentage of Women in Parliament” is most intriguing. The 
source of data for the variable is World Bank.  
The sixth control variable is another measure of democratic development, Polity 
IV. While the percentage of women in parliament captures a very specific angle of 
democratic development, Polity IV is a more generalized measure. Even though Serra 
(2006) could not definitively confirm this variable, many previous works stress out its 
importance. The data for this variable is taken from the Polity project.  
 
Data reconfiguration 
The data used in this research is supplied by a variety of sources and presented in 
a variety of formats. To become comparable over time as well as across sections, it needs 
to be transformed to a harmonized layout. The one most suitable for the purposes in 
question is referred to as cross-sectional time series or panel data, which implies a 
number of subjects observed at several points in time. From now on, cases of sanctions or 
threats are split into multiple observations that capture the state of variables before, 
during and after sanctions or threats. 
A crucial requirement for statistical analysis is homogeneity of all participating 
data. This means that the software will simply ignore observations with less than 100% of 
variables present and imperfect uniformity. This is a challenge since most datasets, 
including the ones used here, have coding errors and blank spots due to various 
methodological difficulties. Data on corruption is commonly unavailable for years 1996 
to 2000 for non-western countries, economic data can be missing in certain years even for 
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European countries and intricate information, such as percentage of women in 
parliament, may not be accumulated. 
The following example of Afghanistan represents a common situation with data. 
CPI values are missing for the years 1998 through 2004 and 2006, “Corruption Control,” 
“Voice and Accountability,” and “Rule of Law” are missing for years 1999 and 2001, 
Imports are missing 1999 through 2001, “Women in Parliament” counter skips half of the 
values, “Natural Resource Rents” does not have years 1998 to 2000, and “Polity IV” has 
not been assessed at all.  
Table 3. An example of a typical country data block with many missing values. 
Country Year Threats CPI WGI Voice Law Imports Women Rents Polity  
Afghanistan 1998 0  -1.8362645 -2.03916836 -1.738658     
Afghanistan 1999 0         
Afghanistan 2000 0  -1.9137625 -1.97951841 -1.769708     
Afghanistan 2001 0       5.2212432  
Afghanistan 2002 0  -1.4264005 -1.57130158 -1.771932 65.287704  4.80527447  
Afghanistan 2003 1  -1.5468522 -1.28107846 -1.671077 94.3441702  3.33785576  
Afghanistan 2004 0  -1.4243098 -1.24791002 -1.710013 87.1393244  2.00452304  
Afghanistan 2005 0 2.50 -1.4591824 -1.17805731 -1.72003 77.467145 27.3 1.7376353  
Afghanistan 2006 0  -1.4229853 -1.19007576 -1.951647 74.0850568 27.3 2.32329753  
Afghanistan 2007 0 1.80 -1.5853521 -1.12143588 -1.920528 58.3500468 27.7 1.93400868  
Afghanistan 2008 0 1.50 -1.6410213 -1.23575115 -1.943695 55.0725456 27.7 2.4811511  
Afghanistan 2009 0 1.30 -1.5150826 -1.46062744 -1.907672 42.1992285 27.3 1.64183433  
Afghanistan 2010 0 1.40 -1.6264788 -1.48184919 -1.901546 44.9434783 27.7 2.37293444  
Afghanistan 2011 0 1.52 -1.5497882 -1.40481281 -1.938522 44.1939481 27.7 2.25270335  
 
There are two solutions for this problem. One is to preemptively exclude 
observations: years or countries that frequently lack the needed values. This is  
problematic because many important cases, such as Iran or Iraq, are among the countries 
on which consistent data is not available. On the other hand, the countries with good 
coverage tend to be clean and not sanctioned. 
The other option is to estimate the missing values. This method is useful for series 
of observations where all but one or two values are present, and discarding the entire 
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series (13 observations, 104 values) will hurt the model more than estimating the missing 
elements (2 values). 
In the following example, Belarus is measured to be 4.1 corrupt in 2000 and 4.8 
corrupt in 2002 on the CPI scale. The missing value for 2001 is unlikely to be something 
as extreme as 1 or 10, it is much more likely to be somewhere between 4.1 and 4.8. As a 
compromise, it is acceptable to approximate the two and use their mean 4.45 to fill in the 
blank spot. Since this is an approximation, it will not mislead the model. The same 
applies to “Corruption Control” missing values: the year 1999 can be filled in with a 
mean of 1998 (-0.6330635) and 2000 (-0.5031862) and 2001 can be filled in with the 
mean of 2000 (-0.5031862) and 2002 (-0.7791886). This way, an entire block of data 
(over 100 values) for Belarus does not have to be excluded from the working dataset. 
Otherwise, the software would have reported unharmonized data and refused to calculate 
the model with Belarus in the data. 
Table 4. Estimation of missing variables. 
 
Missing Values Estimated Values 
CPI Corruption Control CPI Corruption Control 
Belarus 1998 3.90 -0.6330635 3.90 -0.6330635 
Belarus 1999 3.40  3.40 -0.5681248 
Belarus 2000 4.10 -0.5031862 4.10 -0.5031862 
Belarus 2001   4.45 -0.6411874 
Belarus 2002 4.80 -0.7791886 4.80 -0.7791886 
 
However, it can only be done to certain cases with before and after- values. In the 
following example, Sri Lanka is missing four values for “CPI” and “Women in 
Parliaments.” For the latter, values can be estimated as previously explained. However, 
for “CPI,” this is not the case. Even though all values for the years 2002 and later are 
present, there is nothing to base an estimation for years before 2002. Therefore, either the 
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entire block of data for Sri Lanka has to be dismissed, or all observations for years 1998, 
1999, 2000, and 2001 have to be dismissed. 
Table 5. Unacceptable estimation of missing variables. 
 
Missing Values Estimated Values 
CPI Women in Parliaments CPI Women in Parliaments 
Sri Lanka 1998  5.3  5.3 
Sri Lanka 1999  4.9  4.9 
Sri Lanka 2000    4.65 
Sri Lanka 2001    4.65 
Sri Lanka 2002 3.70 4.4 3.70 4.4 
 
For this research, a reasonable balance between the two options has been 
exercised. Several early years had to be discarded due to overly pronounced problems 
with sources for the main dependent variable (missing observations, high standard error) 
as well as frequent blank spots for control variables. Some countries, such as 
Afghanistan, were discarded due to wide unavailability of data for the dependent and 
control variables. At the same time, a few values were estimated, but never more than 
two in a row. This is forced, but nonetheless a compromise: there is no tangible 
alternative, and the remaining data, in the end, still makes up over 1000 observations (x9 
variables = over 9000 values to feed the software). This is sufficient to claim high 
generalizability of the results. 
The unit of time was chosen as a year. The time scale was set 1999 through 2011. 
Even though earlier years are available in WGI and CPI, they provide less countries, 
which would result in discarding more country blocks in exchange for gaining a few 
years. TIES list all threats and sanctions as cases. A country can be involved in several 
unrelated cases with different senders at a single point in time. Some cases of sanctions 
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can last for decades while some were initiated and never officially settled. To account for 
this, a new dataset was assembled. Each country that per TIES received at least one 
threat, was put on a time scale from 1945 (earliest in TIES) to 2011 with year as a unit of 
time and an active threats counter. This counter would receive a +1 each year a country 
was threatened and -1 when a threat was lifted. If a country was under multiple threats in 
one year, the counter would receive as many +1 as there were threats declared.  
The resulting dataset was juxtaposed to WGI and CPI to match countries. Non-
matches were discarded while every match received a matrix of values illustrating under 
how many threats each country was for every year 1999 to 2011. Then, each of the 
matrices received a set of corresponding control variables. 
Table 6. An example of the transformed data. 
 Country  Year Active Threats WGI CPI 
Argentina 1999 0 -0.2611078 3 
Argentina 2000 0 -0.3380573 3.5 
Argentina 2001 1 -0.4259716 3.5 
Argentina 2002 1 -0.5138859 2.8 
Argentina 2003 2 -0.5224265 2.5 
Argentina 2004 2 -0.4540041 2.5 
Argentina 2005 2 -0.4291738 2.8 
Argentina 2006 2 -0.3726146 2.9 
Argentina 2007 2 -0.3746215 2.9 
Argentina 2008 0 -0.4738485 2.9 
Argentina 2009 0 -0.5028509 2.9 
Argentina 2010 0 -0.4126481 2.9 
Argentina 2011 0 -0.4020743 3 
 
The biggest limitation of the chosen strategy is unavailability of data. Among the 
many cases of economic sanctions, one could differentiate light, medium and severe 
ones. The latter are the most interesting since the damage to the economy is most 
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apparent to domestic elites, hence the threats must have caused more political havoc. 
According to the theory, sanctions against Iran, Iraq, Cuba, and South Africa would show 
the biggest impact on corruption – however, including these into this research is 
impossible due to unavailable measurements. Therefore the research ends up accounting 
for light and medium sanctions and threats that by definition are not supposed to cause 
much damage to the targets. This plays against the model: it will reduce the impact of the 
“Threats” variable, and the likelihood of statistical significance. However, should the 
model reach statistical significance regardless of this limitation, one might argue that the 






 IV. RESULTS  
 
The resulting dataset contains 83 subjects, each observed 13 times, totaling at 
1067 observations. Each of the regions of the world – Africa, East Asia, Europe, Central 
Asia, Latin America, Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia – is represented by at 
least one country. Included are observations of up to four threats per country over the 
observed period, among which are ones that have pre-existing threats, ones that receive 
new threats and ones that have no threats at all.  
Only 16 values had to be filled in for the main dependent variable “CPI,” which is 
about 1% of all its values. 166 values had to be estimated for the secondary independent 
variable “Control of Corruption,” which is roughly 15% of all its values. Throughout the 
entire dataset, a total of 545 values out of 8536 had to be estimated or manually edited in, 
which composes 6% of all used data. Most, but not all missing values received a mean of 
their closest neighboring values. Some of the numbers were researched and thoughtfully 
typed in using the original coding. For example, the missing values on the percentage of 
seats occupied by women in representative institutions were taken from the official 
documents where available. 
Two identical statistical models were programmed: one for the CPI-sourced 
dependent variable and one for the WGI-sourced dependent variable. Both compare the 
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relationships between one independent variable and six control variables competing for 
correlation significance to the dependent variable: 
Corruption (CPI or WGI) ~ Active Threats + Rule of Law + Voice and Accountability + 
Rents % of GDP + Imports % of GDP + % of Women in Parliaments + Polity IV 
 
Table 7. Comparing results of the two statistical models. 
Variable Statistical Significance (>|1.9| is 
significant) 
 CPI WGI 
Active Threats -2.9762 0.8276 
Rule of Law 16.6912 20.6197 
Voice and Accountability 8.0458 13.266 
Rents 0.2426 1.4109 
Imports 3.2065 1.1261 
Women in parliaments 0.0525 2.2847 
Polity IV -3.6148 -6.0162 
 
The CPI-based model summary (Appendix A) reports a highly significant 
correlation for the two main variables confirming that threats of sanctions result in lower 
Transparency International scores for potential target states. The WGI-based model 
summary (Appendix B) reports a positive correlation between threats and WGI scores, 
but the relationship is not statistically significant. In other words, the hypothesis is 
confirmed with one source for the dependent variable and not confirmed by the other. 
This calls for further investigation. 
There are two possible reasons a correlation can be statistically insignificant: a 
bad hypothesis or a bad data. The former can be tested by running the model with a 
different source for one of the variables to see if the T-value improves. The latter can be 
investigated by taking a closer look at the data, which may be distorted by outlying cases, 
coding errors or unfit methodology.  
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In case of these research results, there are two possible scenarios: there is either a 
valid hypothesis with good CPI and bad WGI data – or a wrongful hypothesis with bad 
CPI and good WGI data. If so, confirming the first scenario implies examination of WGI 
values for flaws and verifying CPI results.  
Table 8. Explaining the contrary outcomes of the two used models. 
 Hypothesis CPI data WGI data 
Scenario 1 Confirmed, + Good, + Bad, - 
Scenario 2 Unconfirmed, - Bad, - Good, + 
 
In regards to WGI, there are three factors that most likely distort the model: a 
rather high percentage of filled-in values, an approximation-based methodology, and the 
presence of two exceptionally highly correlated control variables. Each of them by itself 
is not likely to cause problems, but altogether in one dataset is enough to affect the 
results.   
First, as previously mentioned, about 15% of all values for control of corruption 
had to be approximated, or, in other words, estimated to make possible the comparison 
between the sources for the dependent variable. It is a common practice, which usually 
does not throw off any calculations since the model deals with approximations anyway. 
However, at a certain threshold, too many of such fill-ins start to affect results. This 
threshold varies for different sample sizes, so there is no way to be sure – but it might be 
the case for this research.  
Second, WGI authors highly emphasize that the mathematical model used to 
calculate their data does not give precise final scores, instead it gives the averages of the 
arrays of possible final scores. This is why they provide standard errors and confidence 
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interval values along with the scores. It does not mean that the values are not usable for 
research – on the contrary, the authors aim at the scholarly audience. It does mean, 
however, that for certain situations the provided precision may be not enough. 
Third, two of the six control variables – “Rule of Law” and “Voice and 
accountability” – are drawn from the same source as “Control of Corruption.” The 
authors of WGI are not very explicit about it, but there is a chance that some of the 
underlying sources may have been used to calculate not one, but two or three of the 
mentioned variables. After all, conceptually the three are related, and the scarceness of 
the early years had to be somehow compensated. Perhaps, this is why “Rule of Law” and 
“Voice and Accountability” so highly correlate with “Control of Corruption”: ten and six 
times the threshold for statistical significance. Such a correlation could easily overwhelm 
the subtle relationship with active threats: the correlation may still be there, just not seen 
through the highly correlated controls. 
The CPI data is neither free from flaws, but seems more reliable than “Control Of 
Corruption.” Only 1% of the used values were manually filled in, and the assembly 
methodology implies hard numbers for scores, not arrays of possible values. The same 
methodology, however, received some criticism, as mentioned before, mostly over its 
time comparability issues. Should this be the case, this research contains means of 
protection against such issues. The utilized model uses a cross-sectional time-series 
analysis, meaning comparisons are made not only across years, but also across countries. 
In fact, the dataset features 13 time observations compared to 83 cross-sectional 
observations. This makes up only 13% of all comparisons. The most variance is drawn 
across sections rather than time. The precise dependence on time over sectional 
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comparisons is hard to calculate as it varies by the sample sizes, but it is safe to assume 
that even if CPI data is completely incomparable over time, which is most likely not the 
case, the model heavily relies on cross-sectional comparisons and therefore remains 
valid. 
As an additional validation measure, 13 strictly cross-sectional model runs were 
performed to mitigate the effect of over-time comparisons. The working dataset was split 
in 13 to isolate each of the years 1999 through 2011. 
Table 9. A by-year statistical significance test. 
Year T-Value Statistical Significance 
1998 -0.071857  
1999 0.280366  
2000 0.006083  
2001 -0.215021  
2002 -0.204011  
2003 -0.117898  
2005 -0.143485  
2006 -0.215181  
2007 -0.409134 * 
2008 -0.0734133  
2009 0.038212  
2010 -0.6161649 * 
2011 -0.421794  
 
Ten out of thirteen runs report negative estimated effect for the independent 
variable with 8 having an impact more than 0.1, meaning that strictly cross-sectional 
results are not much different from combined cross-sectional and over time results. This 
proves that the original T-value (Appendix A) is a valid result. 
Out of the ten, some are statistically significant with higher impact (above 0.1), 
some not. This is due to a dramatically smaller data (87 compared to 1067) and by itself 
does not mean anything as statistical significance is a product of the sample size.  
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With all the evidence considered, the most likely explanation of the research 
results is Scenario 1: WGI data is compromised by a variety of factors while CPI data is 
correct and confirms the hypothesis. It is worth noting that this entire situation, where 
two similar datasets, both grounded in a perceptional edge of the phenomenon, turn out to 
be so different from each other, deserves separate research. However, it falls out of the 
scope of this study.  
An interesting situation is observed with the control variables, four of which show 
statistical significance: “Rule of Law,” “Voice and Accountability,” “Imports,” and 
“Polity IV.” 
Keeping in mind that the first two potentially correlate with each other due to 
methodology, the reported significance levels are very high: 8 times the threshold for 
“Rule of Law” and 4 times the threshold for “Voice and Accountability” with both 
correlations positive. This is a conceptually expected result: different forms and measures 
of accountability are mentioned in many studies as a remedy for corruption, and a strong 
law system acts as a deterrent for any sort of malicious activity, including corrupt 
behavior. However, the significance is so strong that it potentially reduces significances 
of other variables. The fact that the main independent variable active threats is 
nonetheless reported as significant testifies that the relationship is robust. 
Another implication of such a strong correlation is that “Rule of Law” and “Voice 
and Accountability” potentially act as a structuring element of the model. Essentially, the 
rest of the variables can be interpreted with regards to these two variables. For example, 
if two countries have a similar legal system and are roughly equal in regards to civil 
society development, the differences in the amount of international trade will determine 
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their corruption levels. This kind of argumentation, of course, is rather arbitrary, but 
nonetheless important to note, as one of the other control variables may be dramatically 
affected by this effect.  
“Polity IV,” a measure of democratic development and the associated government 
accountability, was expected to show a positive correlation: the more democratic a 
country is, the higher it stands in TI’s ratings with lower corruption. In a surprising 
contrast, it shows the exact opposite as a part of the model, with a high statistical 
significance: the more democratic a country is, the lower its TI’s standing. In a vacuum, 
this could be a worthy discovery and a dead end for this research. However, as discussed 
above, it should be interpreted with regards to other, potentially stronger, variables of the 
model. 
First, its impact on the model is low: -0.034. This is smaller than that of the main 
independent variable, which was never expected to be large. Second, a separate run of the 
model just with “CPI” and “Polity IV” returns a more orthodox picture, with a significant 
positive correlation: the more democratic a country is, the higher its TI rating: 
Polity  0.0207624  0.0091332  2.2733  0.02321  * 
 
This is exactly the case of “structuring” variables discussed above. It does not 
mean that by itself, democratic development causes corruption. It means that with every 
other significant variable equal – “Rule of Law,” “Voice and Accountability” and 
“Imports” – a higher “Polity IV” rating will result in a slightly lower TI’s score and 
potentially a more corrupt country. It makes logical sense too: autocracies like Russia 
often fake democratic development for reputational reasons and newly democratized 
states are still struggling with their institutional system. The democratic rating may go 
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slightly up or down, but it would not mean much as the country is not really a proper 
democracy and still produces corruption. In fact, this is mentioned in several publications 
with the latest one offering a more correct measure in that regard: prolonged exposure to 
democracy (Serra, 2006). 
The fourth significant control variable behaves in a more orthodox way with a 
minor positive impact on the model of 0.006. Confirming the expectations, more 
international trade results in a lower TI rating meaning lower corruption. 
Together with the main independent variable, the four significant control 
variables form the final equation that can be used to estimate the impact of threats of 
sanctions on a given country: 
Corruption = 4.14 – 0.09(threats) - 0.03(Polity IV) + 1.22(Law) + 
0.72(Voice) + 0.01(Imports) 
 
Essentially, this implies that with everything else equal, any additional threat of 
sanctions will decrease a country’s corruption score roughly by 0.1 point. 
For example, the most recent information on Russia in the dataset dates 2011. It 
states that the country did not have any active threats and had -0.74 “Rule of Law,” -0.87 
“Voice and Accountability,” 20.1 “Imports,” 13.6% “Women in Parliament,” and “Polity 
IV” rating of 4. This results in 2.42 projected corruption. Should a threat be issued, it 
would raise the projection to 2.53. Many related threats are issued by different countries 
or by the US and the EU separately – these cases are coded in TIES as multiple threats. 
So, when four years later the US and EU threatened and imposed sanctions on Russia in 
regards to the Crimea (year 2014) incident, the score was projected to drop by ~0.2. 
Unfortunately, post-2012 CPI scores are not comparable to the ones used in this research. 
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However, the post-2012 score lineup for Russia can be argued to potentially confirm the 
predicted trend:  
Table 10. Modern CPI scores for Russia.  
Year 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 
CPI Score 29 29 27 28 28 
 
In a broader context, 0.1 may not seem like a lot, but it is the most common 
variation pattern in the CPI data. It is very rare for a country’s score to jump by 20, 10 or 
even 2 points. Corruption has its social roots, which cannot be rapidly fixed. A country 
can, however, launch an anti-corruption initiative that will gradually increase its standing. 
For Russia, 2015 was plagued by corruption scandals, especially after the Panama Files 
revelation. In the end, many government officials have lost jobs or were put into jail, 
which may have positively influenced the later score. 
Since the coding utilized in this research is no longer used by its authors and will 
never be updated, a more tangible way of thinking is advised: percentage increases. To 
convert score increases to percentage increases, one should consider the “before” score 
and an actual increase. А rather clean country would have a score of 8 and a minimum 
decrease of 0.1: converting into percentage, 0.1:8 x 100% = 1.25%. For a rather corrupt 








Using multiple regression on a custom cross-sectional time series dataset of more 
than a thousand observations, this research found the correlation between the main 
independent variable “Threats of Sanctions” and the main dependent variable “Level of 
Corruption” statistically significant. This leads to a conclusion that signaling forthcoming 
efforts to limit or end economic relations with a country to persuade a change in its 
policies is likely to increase the level of corruption in the said country. The model 
suggests a 0.1 Corruption Perception Score (older version) decrease for each new round 
of threats, which translates into a minimum of 1.25% increase in corruption for relatively 
clean countries and a 5% increase in corruption for more corrupt counties. 
The hypothesis is tested against six control variables based on previously 
confirmed theories.  The data for the dependent variable is taken from two separate 
sources covering all options available at the moment, and no data tailoring techniques are 
used to highlight the results. Such an open approach expectedly led to several 
methodological challenges which are discussed in the corresponding section. After an 
investigation, each of the challenges was found to have no significant effect on the 
research. Nonetheless, the hypothesis in question should be accepted with regards to the 
utilized methodology. 
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Since the biggest caveat of all statistically-inclined studies is the quality of data, 
further research is advised should the new versions of the used datasets be published. 
Transparency International has been using their new methodology, less affected by the 
“ranking” problem, since 2012 – there are now 6 more years of better quality data. The 
same applies to World Bank’s WGI project. However, the TIES project remains in its 
2014 state and does not cover the years 2010 and later. 
Like a disease, corruption starts in exposed tissue of a “social organism,” hides its 
symptoms to maximize the infection, and attacks at the moment of utmost weakness. 
Small amounts of it come and go in any regime or economy not causing severe 
consequences kept at bay by laws, leadership, and civic consciousness. However, an ill-
considered political maneuver, a hasty reform, a careless external influence, or a lack of 
modernization can overwhelm the system and allow corruption to break institutional 
barriers spreading throughout the society. If neglected, this may turn lethal: what started 
as a rather ordinary protest against a corrupt government in the seemingly healthy nation 
of Ukraine in 2014, quickly spiraled out of control and ended with a sovereignty crisis, a 
loss of territories, and a civil war that is yet to be resolved. 
In a small number of outlying cases, corruption can be seen from an optimistic 
angle: as a social defense mechanism. It can bring some relief to overregulated markets, 
serve as a social equalizer in abusive authoritarian regimes, and even act as a 
globalization vessel. In the Soviet Union, not only did corruption allow some flow of 
consumer goods and services to otherwise desperate regions, but it also sustained a large 
black market, which served as eloquent evidence that economic laws, as laws of physics, 
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work regardless of ideologies and political will. Arguably, this helped in the later 
transformation from a state-controlled economy to a capitalistic economy.  
In all other cases, however, corruption conveys nothing but inefficiency and 
disorder. It has been shown to limit economic growth (Mauro, 1995; Mo, 2001; Tanzi & 
Davoodi, 2002), reduce investment activity (Brunetti, Kisunko, & Weder, 1998; Campos, 
Lien, & Pradhan, 1999; Mauro, 1996), cap productivity (Lambsdorff, 2003), misbalance 
economic systems (Al-Marhubi, 2000; Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, & Zoido-Lobaton, 
2000; Johnson, Kaufmann, & Shleifer, 1997; Schneider, Buehn, & Montenegro, 2010), 
discourage innovation (Lau, Yang, Zhang, and Leung, 2015), and distort social spending 
(Mauro, 1998). 
Countries plagued by corruption are notorious for high economic disparity, 
abusive power structure, and a low cost of human life (Zelekha & Sharabi, 2012). They 
are also known for frequent attempts to address these issues with no tangible success. 
This is no surprise. Past a certain threshold, corruption, much like cancer, can integrate 
itself into the regime structure. Once it becomes a part of the system, it can help the 
system sustain and replicate itself. The tradeoff, however, is that the infection will 
progress. With each new cycle, there will be more corruption and less institutions 
solidifying the system – until the country is governed by blood ties, personal favors, and 
propaganda champions. This is what happened to the Ba’athist Iraq, which was 
transformed from an overly pragmatic secular regime before the Gulf War into a hybrid 
twist at a personalist theocracy before the Iraq campaign of 2003 (Anderson & Stansfield, 
2005). 
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As discussed in the Chapter II, many of the said countries often find themselves in 
the middle of various international scandals and, consequently, on the receiving end of 
economic sanctions. The reasons why this happens, whether the recipients of sanctions 
deserve them, and the extent to which corruption may affect international relations falls 
out of the scope of this research. One can notice, however, that many of the countries that 
have been threatened with economic sanctions throughout the last few decades – Iran, 
Iraq, Libya, Syria, Lebanon, South Sudan, North Korea, Belarus, Russia, Cuba, etc. – 
also happened to have a low standing in the common anti-corruption ratings. 
Policy makers often prefer economic sanctions to other policy options for the 
“softer,” more humane reputation. This is especially the case when the alternatives 
involve any sort of military actions: not going to war is always better than going to war. 
Formulated like this, the rationale certainly seems correct – but it may be an elusive 
oversimplification. A textbook axiom of diplomacy and negotiation states that if it seems 
there is no better third option, a good diplomat must invent one (Fisher & Ury, 1991; 
Lebow, 1996). Perhaps, we will never know the real thought process behind the famous 
sanction rounds, but it just may be as simple as choosing the easiest policy with the best 
PR – no thought of humanity involved. 
At the same time, the deeper the scientific community looks into the concept of 
economic sanctions, the more apparent it becomes that the unintended consequences of 
the subject are very much tangible and must be included in decision-making. Since the 
first serious efforts to study the subject back in the 90s, it has been known that while 
harming economies, sanctions affect regular citizens perhaps more than the political 
leadership. The recent efforts by Kamali, Mashayekh, and Jandaghi (2016) showed that 
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imposed economic sanctions may worsen corruption in the target states, which also 
affects citizens first and foremost. My research has shown that even threats of economic 
sanctions may have a substantial negative effect on corruption. 
With this in mind, making a decision to threaten or impose sanctions on a state is 
not just about an economic scarcity in an effort to reach or not reach political goals. It is 
about putting the citizens of the said country through a number of complications, of 
which higher corruption is just one of the challenges. Political goals may be reached or 
forgotten, but corruption will stay to poison people’s lives for a very long time. 
Additionally, for certain already corrupt systems, this increase may put an end to the 
already slow-paced anti-corruption efforts, reversing past reforms and making things 
worse. 
Does it mean that sanctions must be out of the question? No, but greater care and 
analysis should be employed in their implementation. Just like scientists are able to better 
predict the success rates of sanctions judging by involved factors, the unintended 






APPENDIX A. MODEL SUMMARY, CPI DATA 
 
plm(formula = cpi ~ tactive + law + voice + rent + import + women




                 var std.dev share 
idiosyncratic 0.1272  0.3566 0.223 
individual    0.4435  0.6659 0.777 
theta  :  
   Min. 1st Qu.  Median    Mean 3rd Qu.    Max.  
 0.8472  0.8531  0.8531  0.8530  0.8531  0.8531  
 
Residuals : 
    Min.  1st Qu.   Median     Mean  3rd Qu.     Max.  
-1.36000 -0.23800  0.00859  0.00001  0.24700  1.96000  
 
Coefficients : 
               Estimate  Std. Error t-value  Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)  4.17990905  0.11731599 35.6295 < 2.2e-16 *** 
tactive     -0.08776389  0.02948846 -2.9762 0.0029848 **  
law          1.22264033  0.07325063 16.6912 < 2.2e-16 *** 
voice        0.71332105  0.08865725  8.0458 2.287e-15 *** 
rent         0.00063025  0.00259776  0.2426 0.8083534     
import       0.00586271  0.00182840  3.2065 0.0013841 **  
women        0.00015429  0.00293730  0.0525 0.9581175     
polity      -0.03527762  0.00975916 -3.6148 0.0003147 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Total Sum of Squares:    265.06 
Residual Sum of Squares: 148.85 
R-Squared:      0.43841 
Adj. R-Squared: 0.43469 















APPENDIX B. MODEL SUMMARY, WGI DATA 
 
plm(formula = corruption ~ tactive + law + voice + rent + import 




                  var std.dev share 
idiosyncratic 0.01996 0.14129 0.265 
individual    0.05533 0.23522 0.735 
theta  :  
   Min. 1st Qu.  Median    Mean 3rd Qu.    Max.  
 0.8291  0.8357  0.8357  0.8356  0.8357  0.8357  
 
Residuals : 
    Min.  1st Qu.   Median     Mean  3rd Qu.     Max.  
-0.56400 -0.09250 -0.00168  0.00001  0.10000  0.57400  
 
Coefficients : 
               Estimate  Std. Error t-value  Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)  0.03446457  0.04370587  0.7886   0.43055     
tactive      0.00958361  0.01157931  0.8276   0.40806     
law          0.57676203  0.02797139 20.6197 < 2.2e-16 *** 
voice        0.45689292  0.03444102 13.2660 < 2.2e-16 *** 
rent         0.00142098  0.00100712  1.4109   0.15856     
import       0.00079337  0.00070450  1.1261   0.26036     
women        0.00259916  0.00113762  2.2847   0.02253 *   
polity      -0.02276696  0.00378427 -6.0162 2.458e-09 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Total Sum of Squares:    58.849 
Residual Sum of Squares: 23.009 
R-Squared:      0.60901 
Adj. R-Squared: 0.60642 










APPENDIX C. CROSS-SECTIONAL TESTS 
The year 2000 
lm(formula = cpi ~ tactive + rent + women + polity + law + voice 
+  
    import + brit, data = balanov2000) 
 
Residuals: 
     Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max  
-1.90296 -0.60615 -0.00554  0.52558  1.66440  
 
Coefficients: 
             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)  3.655218   0.442453   8.261 4.55e-12 *** 
tactive      0.280366   0.263294   1.065 0.290457     
rent        -0.003815   0.009370  -0.407 0.685079     
women        0.053896   0.013290   4.055 0.000124 *** 
polity      -0.046716   0.046512  -1.004 0.318507     
law          1.675751   0.313107   5.352 9.61e-07 *** 
voice        0.345495   0.506694   0.682 0.497485     
import       0.001189   0.005842   0.204 0.839252     
brit        -0.007640   0.228001  -0.034 0.973360     
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Residual standard error: 0.8508 on 73 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0.8795, Adjusted R-squared:  0.8663  
F-statistic: 66.62 on 8 and 73 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16 
 
The year 2005 
lm(formula = cpi ~ tactive + rent + women + polity + law + voice 
+  
    import + brit, data = balanov2005) 
 
Residuals: 
     Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max  
-1.81546 -0.57080  0.07477  0.45779  2.23484  
 
Coefficients: 
             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)  4.473264   0.457155   9.785 6.38e-15 *** 
tactive     -0.143485   0.211281  -0.679    0.499     
rent         0.005629   0.007223   0.779    0.438     
women        0.015081   0.010963   1.376    0.173     
polity      -0.036034   0.045978  -0.784    0.436     
57 
law          2.049533   0.296983   6.901 1.59e-09 *** 
voice        0.284988   0.460202   0.619    0.538     
import      -0.009525   0.005648  -1.686    0.096 .   
brit        -0.047098   0.215710  -0.218    0.828     
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Residual standard error: 0.8144 on 73 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0.8913, Adjusted R-squared:  0.8794  
F-statistic: 74.82 on 8 and 73 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16 
 
 
The year 2010 
lm(formula = cpi ~ tactive + rent + women + polity + law + voice 
+  
    import + brit, data = balanov2010) 
 
Residuals: 
     Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max  
-1.85299 -0.40795 -0.01584  0.36469  1.89159  
 
Coefficients: 
              Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)  3.7218829  0.4144124   8.981 2.02e-13 *** 
tactive     -0.6161649  0.3634288  -1.695   0.0943 .   
rent         0.0159726  0.0119257   1.339   0.1846     
women        0.0165340  0.0089899   1.839   0.0700 .   
polity      -0.0013430  0.0361151  -0.037   0.9704     
law          1.8841085  0.1878785  10.028 2.26e-15 *** 
voice        0.2505408  0.3151582   0.795   0.4292     
import      -0.0001667  0.0045594  -0.037   0.9709     
brit         0.1557598  0.1801965   0.864   0.3902     
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Residual standard error: 0.6834 on 73 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0.9164, Adjusted R-squared:  0.9073  





APPENDIX D. AN EXAMPLE OF THE USED DATA 
Country Year Threats CPI WGI Voice  Law Imports  Women  Rents  Polity 
Botswana 1999 0 6.1 0.685998 0.684688 0.557219 43.73181 12.75 0.321932 8 
Botswana 2000 0 6 0.666208 0.644338 0.530072 40.09292 17 1.306048 8 
Botswana 2001 0 6 0.636107 0.64786 0.516139 38.86746 17 0.410022 8 
Botswana 2002 1 6.4 0.606006 0.651381 0.502207 39.67835 17 0.372326 8 
Botswana 2003 1 5.7 1.249669 0.691375 0.668233 37.00718 17 1.486268 8 
Botswana 2004 0 6 0.879439 0.7264 0.635065 41.38404 11.1 3.372387 8 
Botswana 2005 0 5.9 1.139363 0.574184 0.603252 35.5818 11.1 3.794392 8 
Botswana 2006 0 5.6 0.91353 0.488446 0.581072 34.08012 11.1 7.980872 8 
Botswana 2007 0 5.4 0.95375 0.480852 0.615701 40.58856 11.1 9.335123 8 
Botswana 2008 0 5.8 0.996397 0.484717 0.663688 51.04194 11.1 6.562389 8 
Botswana 2009 0 5.6 0.921875 0.421427 0.65415 51.88509 7.9 11.61408 8 
Botswana 2010 0 5.8 1.003046 0.442224 0.666599 51.2643 7.9 4.608759 8 
Botswana 2011 0 6.08 0.978981 0.396829 0.660973 52.46402 7.9 3.996135 8 
Brazil 1999 2 4.1 0.009087 0.162806 -0.30344 11.41728 5.7 3.190335 8 
Brazil 2000 1 3.9 0.016784 0.152321 -0.30056 12.45166 5.7 3.536007 8 
Brazil 2001 0 4 0.013821 0.270919 -0.30188 14.56463 6.8 3.827598 8 
Brazil 2002 0 4 0.010858 0.389518 -0.30319 13.38774 6.2 4.820669 8 
Brazil 2003 0 3.9 0.100637 0.388666 -0.40038 12.95962 8.6 5.408382 8 
Brazil 2004 0 3.9 0.048646 0.374534 -0.3923 13.13247 8.6 5.374185 8 
Brazil 2005 1 3.7 -0.17166 0.445051 -0.49124 11.84299 8.6 6.3381 8 
Brazil 2006 1 3.3 -0.13588 0.444468 -0.41742 11.66735 8.8 6.5669 8 
Brazil 2007 1 3.5 -0.11887 0.48451 -0.43566 11.96491 9 7.254887 8 
Brazil 2008 1 3.5 -0.02482 0.515287 -0.36469 13.7236 9 7.909064 8 
Brazil 2009 1 3.7 -0.12223 0.485682 -0.21689 11.25462 8.8 4.582327 8 
Brazil 2010 1 3.7 6.46E-05 0.534234 -0.00123 11.7792 8.6 5.994677 8 
Brazil 2011 0 3.77 0.149356 0.474238 -0.00277 12.24316 8.6 6.177798 8 
Bulgaria 1999 0 3.3 -0.22597 0.388696 -0.2969 47.789 10.8 1.486131 8 
Bulgaria 2000 0 3.5 -0.21346 0.410531 -0.22985 41.83553 10.8 1.576104 8 
Bulgaria 2001 0 3.9 -0.2046 0.447624 -0.1627 44.35047 26.2 1.178486 9 
Bulgaria 2002 0 4 -0.19574 0.484716 -0.09554 41.73043 26.2 1.033479 9 
Bulgaria 2003 0 3.9 -0.07107 0.511635 -0.19443 44.74551 26.2 1.005669 9 
Bulgaria 2004 0 4.1 0.098728 0.543205 -0.12716 52.2336 26.3 1.489302 9 
Bulgaria 2005 0 4 0.058662 0.573733 -0.15934 57.27596 22.1 1.798932 9 
Bulgaria 2006 0 4 -0.10077 0.552744 -0.13943 64.21033 22.1 2.827915 9 
Bulgaria 2007 0 4.1 -0.23441 0.677658 -0.10569 70.64818 21.7 2.278525 9 
Bulgaria 2008 0 3.6 -0.30322 0.556534 -0.15945 71.96636 21.7 2.330555 9 
Bulgaria 2009 0 3.8 -0.2472 0.555683 -0.07355 50.70778 20.8 1.42651 9 
Bulgaria 2010 0 3.6 -0.20695 0.524036 -0.10391 56.46038 20.8 2.158527 9 
Bulgaria 2011 0 3.33 -0.22469 0.439416 -0.13722 61.35904 20.8 2.980837 9 
Canada 1999 3 9.2 2.234577 1.606647 1.701885 38.31676 20.6 2.173209 10 
Canada 2000 1 9.2 2.230593 1.591968 1.67699 38.62026 20.6 4.934375 10 
Canada 2001 1 8.9 2.170328 1.558434 1.668739 36.37012 20.6 4.220941 10 
Canada 2002 1 9 2.110062 1.5249 1.660488 35.69829 20.6 3.752474 10 
Canada 2003 1 8.7 2.040142 1.526452 1.703007 33.0156 20.6 4.651266 10 
Canada 2004 0 8.5 1.854109 1.675237 1.704943 32.8926 21.1 5.231334 10 
Canada 2005 0 8.4 1.862308 1.495699 1.660869 32.91473 21.1 6.961839 10 
Canada 2006 0 8.5 1.959607 1.442604 1.792571 32.65184 20.8 7.289658 10 
Canada 2007 0 8.7 1.986761 1.403001 1.791605 32.03888 21.3 7.309141 10 
Canada 2008 0 8.7 1.990844 1.434279 1.799132 32.6011 22.1 9.129771 10 
Canada 2009 0 8.7 2.083347 1.428473 1.805836 29.9125 22.1 4.260511 10 
Canada 2010 0 8.9 2.096699 1.375627 1.809824 30.98877 22.1 5.025616 10 
Canada 2011 0 8.67 1.999401 1.405911 1.743252 31.764 24.8 6.152117 10 
Chile 1999 0 6.9 1.452781 0.67572 1.181105 27.32577 10.8 6.843796 8 
Chile 2000 0 7.4 1.544587 0.829944 1.258155 28.57805 10.8 8.313613 9 
Chile 2001 0 7.5 1.549254 0.942834 1.278592 30.5423 10.8 7.96643 9 
Chile 2002 0 7.5 1.553922 1.055723 1.299029 30.39377 12.5 8.131393 9 
Chile 2003 0 7.4 1.295729 0.982944 1.237252 31.20012 12.5 8.984974 9 
Chile 2004 0 7.4 1.372828 1.162198 1.308246 30.40366 12.5 13.26716 9 
Chile 2005 0 7.3 1.451734 1.243549 1.271399 31.58502 15 14.57577 9 
Chile 2006 0 7.3 1.429865 1.074864 1.229806 29.51092 15 22.73883 10 
Chile 2007 0 7 1.343457 1.095527 1.233711 31.96091 15 23.03942 10 
Chile 2008 0 6.9 1.327686 0.997636 1.270772 39.5347 15 21.57221 10 
Chile 2009 0 6.7 1.351683 1.008315 1.273902 29.59754 14.2 16.20838 10 
Chile 2010 0 7.2 1.485575 1.094331 1.322361 31.66942 14.2 19.18681 10 
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